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Abstract  
 
Society has tremendously changed the last decade and still is in a transitional period 
because of different technological evolutions. These technological developments affect our 
way of thinking, doing business, communicating, interaction and the work/life balance. Some 
argue the law will need a fundamental make-over as well. The question that arises from a 
legal point of view is thus whether the existing long-standing legal principles are compatible 
with technological evolutions or, instead, new legislation will need to be adopted. If this is the 
case, we will formulate some (general) recommendations that can be taken into account by 
policy-makers, judges and lawyers when creating or applying the law in the ‘society of 
tomorrow’. Our presentation will try to provide an answer to these fundamental issues 
through a case-study of recent evolutions in two different fields of law, namely the 
introduction of self-driving cars (SDCs) in traffic for liability law and the use of social media in 
court proceedings for procedural law. 
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Introduction 
 
Society has changed tremendously in the last decade. It still is in a transitional phase 
because of different technological developments. These evolutions affect our way of 
thinking, doing business, communicating, interaction and the work/life balance. It is, 
therefore, not surprising that several aspects related to those technological evolutions are 
increasingly being studied in academia3 and addressed by policymakers.4 The question that 
arises from a legal point of view is whether some of the existing long-standing legal 
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principles are compatible with technological evolutions or whether new legislation will need 
to be adopted. In this regard, some argue that the law lags behind technological 
development.5 Technological evolutions may expose gaps in the existing legal framework or 
may give rise to undesirable conflicts and call for changes.6 We will try to provide an answer 
to these fundamental issues through a case-study of recent evolutions in two different fields 
of law, namely the introduction of self-driving cars (SDCs) in the area of liability law (part 1) 
and the use of social media for notice of court proceedings in the area of procedural law 
(part 2). We will briefly summarise the main findings of our article in a conclusion. 
 
1. Self-Driving Cars and Liability  
 
A first example that is analysed is the autonomous vehicle. Once some preliminary 
considerations have been discussed (part 1.1.), we will proceed with an analysis of aspects 
related to the liability for damage caused by self-driving cars (part 1.2). 
 
1.1. Preliminary Considerations 
 
Self-driving or autonomous vehicles are no longer a mere futuristic idea. According to 
recent predictions, fully autonomous vehicles could already be available within five to twenty 
years.7 Vehicles, however, will not suddenly become fully autonomous or self-driving. 
Instead, technology will gradually take over a user’s control over the vehicle. Technology 
has already partly taken over some of the user’s tasks in controlling the vehicle. Examples 
thereof are adaptive cruise control, lane keeping assistance and automatic parking systems. 
These forms of partial vehicle are covered by the umbrella term Advanced Driver Assistance 
Systems (ADAS).8 Vehicles will eventually be able to take persons from one place to another 
without any human interference.9 In that case, one can speak of a fully autonomous or 
driverless vehicle.10 Today, only prototypes of such vehicles exist. They are currently being 
tested on the road by companies such as Google and Tesla. 11 
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Bruyne & C. Vanleenhove, ‘The Rise of Self-Driving Cars: Is the Private International Law Framework 
for non-contractual obligations posing a bump in the road?’ [2018] 5 IALS Student Law Review 14-26.  
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The rise of autonomous vehicle technology has different benefits. Foremost, traffic will 
become much safer with software operating the vehicle. The number of accidents will reduce 
as computers are generally much better drivers than their human equivalents. The focus of 
software systems, for instance, does not diminish due to fatigue, alcohol or checking social 
media. The ability of software to react is much faster and more accurate than that of 
humans. Transport will also become more time-efficient with autonomous car technology. 
Self-driving cars will enable people currently facing restrictions in operating a vehicle – such 
as the elderly, minors or disabled people – to fully and independently participate in traffic.12 
At the same time, however, the introduction of self-driving cars will present many challenges. 
Autonomous vehicles will have an influence on various facets of our society such as 
employment, transportation and public infrastructure.13 Software might replace those 
persons nowadays employed in the transportation sector and the related industries.14 More 
importantly, road accidents will not suddenly disappear despite the increased safety as a 
result of SDCs. Autonomous vehicles will share the road with ‘regular’ non-autonomous cars 
and other road users during a long transition period. Recent accidents show that the 
technology used in autonomous vehicles is indeed not entirely flawless. Technological 
sensors do not work perfectly in exceptional circumstances such as stormy weather or 
heavy rainfalls. The autopilot sensors of a Tesla car, for instance, were not able to 
distinguish a white tractor-trailer crossing the highway from the bright sky above, leading to a 
fatal crash.15 In February 2016, an autonomous vehicle hit a bus because it did not know 
that long vehicles are less inclined to stop and give way.16 More recently, several 
newspapers reported an accident with a Tesla autopilot vehicle, which resulted in the 
driver’s death.17 
 
1.2. Liability and SDCs  
 
Against this background, the question arises whether the legal framework dealing with 
the liability for damage caused by SDCs will need a fundamental make-over18 or instead 
minor changes might be sufficient. In other words, one has to assess “whether tort liability 
rules – as they are currently shaped – are suited to govern the “car minus driver” complexity, 
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Guardian, 1 March 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/feb/29/google-self-driving-
car-accident-california.  
17 See: N. Boudette, ‘Fatal Tesla Crash Raises New Questions About Autopilot System’, New York 
Times, 31 March 2018, www.nytimes.com/2018/03/31/business/tesla-crash-autopilot-musk.html, read 
on 1 May 2018.   
18 H. Surden & M.A. Williams, ‘Technological Opacity, Predictability, and Self-Driving Cars’ [2016] 38 
Cardozo L.Rev 136.  
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while simultaneously holding on to their theoretical basis”.19 In any case, some changes to 
the legal framework will be inevitable. The Belgian Highway Code, for example, is not yet 
adapted to the introduction of autonomous car technology as it still requires that each 
vehicle has a ‘driver’.20 The driver must at all times be able to perform the necessary driving 
actions and must have his vehicle under control.21 It is conceivable that the situation in other 
EU Member States will be quite similar. The existing liability rules might also need some 
changes with the commercialisation of SDCs. Reliance on fault-based liability will become 
uncertain in the context of autonomous vehicles. It will, for instance, not be easy to 
determine who the ‘driver’ is in an autonomous vehicle and whether he can be held liable for 
a violation of the law that is actually committed by the vehicle itself (e.g. crossing a red light). 
Research also showed that it is by no means straightforward to hold the user of an 
autonomous vehicle liable for a negligent act in supervising the technology.22 
Liability in traffic-related matters will, therefore, evolve from a fault-based mechanism 
towards forms of strict liability. This means that victims will have to target other parties. 
There are different alternatives in national law. In Belgium, for instance, a party could sue 
the custodian of a defective object under Article 1384, first paragraph, of the Belgian Civil 
Code (BCC). That article imposes a strict liability regime for the custodian of a defective 
object for the damage caused by that object.23 Another more interesting possibility is to file a 
claim against the manufacturer of the vehicles or the software under the EU Product Liability 
Directive.24 Article 1 of the Directive stipulates that the producer will be held liable for 
damage caused by a defect in his product.25 The question arises whether the Product 
Liability Directive is adapted to the reality of self-driving cars. In this regard, the GEAR 2030 
High Level Group concluded that the motor insurance and product liability directives are 
sufficient at least for those systems expected by 2020. After that date, however, the 
application of the Product Liability Directive risks to create a number of problems.26 Against 
this background, we will examine whether this framework is inadequate and out of tune with 
the reality of SDCs by focusing on two elements,27 namely whether software can be qualified 
as product (part 1.2.1) and the moment when the vehicle is put into circulation (part 1.2.2.).28 
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European Union (GEAR 2030), ‘Ensuring that Europe has the most competitive, innovative and 
sustainable automotive industry of the 2030s and beyond’, October 2017, 43-44. 
27 A. Davola, ‘A Model for Tort Liability in a World of Driverless Cars: Establishing a Framework for the 
Upcoming Technology’, 1 February 2018, 2.  
28 See for a discussion: J. De Bruyne & J. Tanghe, ‘Liability for Damage Caused by Autonomous 
Vehicles: a Belgian Perspective’ [2018] 8 J.E.T.L. 355-364 & 367-370.  
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1.2.1. Software as a Product?  
 
Article 2 of the Product Liability Directive defines a product as all movables, with the 
exception of primary agricultural products and game, even though incorporated into another 
movable or into an immovable. There is a debate on the question whether software qualifies 
as product or not. There are several reasons why software cannot be seen as product. For 
instance, software might be qualified as a service and not as a product. In addition, the 
Directive only mentions ‘movables’. Therefore, it relates to tangible goods only. It would 
otherwise make no sense to explicitly include electricity in the scope of the Directive.29 This 
requirement is problematic for software products. Software is a collection of data and 
instructions that is imperceptible for the human eye. A software system is thus often 
regarded as intangible. Accordingly, it might not fall within the scope of the Product Liability 
Act.30  
At the same time, however, there are also some reasons why software should fall 
within the scope of the Product Liability Directive. Software might be seen as the object of a 
service. It is, therefore, covered by the Directive. Software can also be qualified as a product 
because it is captured on a tangible medium or device (e.g. CD-ROM or USB). This has 
been affirmed by the European Commission.31 Software an sich might be considered as a 
material good as well. The Directive could apply to software even if it is qualified as an 
intangible good. After all, the inclusion of electricity clarifies that the drafters of the Directive 
aimed at a wide material scope. Legislators did not think of software in the early 1980s as 
personal computers only became commercially widespread during the second half of the 
1980s. It is thus conceivable that software, in a teleological interpretation of the Directive, 
falls within the scope of the Directive. The European Court of Justice might come to a similar 
conclusion in the future. The inclusion of software in the Directive would also reflect the 
current economic reality in which software is a commercial product just as any other product 
that may entail risks for users and third parties.32 
 
1.2.2. Putting the SDC into Circulation 
 
Pursuant to Article 7(b) of Product Liability Directive, the manufacturer of the product 
can escape liability when he proves that it is probable that the defect causing the damage 
did not exist at the time when the product was put into circulation or that this defect came 
into being afterwards. If software is qualified as a product, any update thereof could be 
considered an act by which the producer brings a new product into circulation. However, it 
becomes more difficult with so-called self-learning systems. These systems are not 
periodically updated but continually improve themselves. For defects that are created in this 
way, a moment of putting the product into circulation cannot be indicated as the 
manufacturer did not perform an act to that end. The same reasoning also applies to the 
liability of the manufacturer of the vehicle. The changes made by a self-learning system and 
																																								 																				
29 Article 2 in fine Product Liability Directive.  
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the updates performed by the software producer can create defects for which the car 
manufacturer is no longer liable. Indeed, those defects did not exist at the time when he put 
the vehicle into circulation. Although the vehicle meets the definition of a product, its 
manufacturer might thus easily escape liability if the damage is caused by a dysfunction in 
the software. One could argue that Article 7(b) Product Liability Directive should be 
inapplicable in those circumstances. This makes it possible for victims to file a claim against 
the manufacturer of the software even when the defect is created through the continuous 
self-development of software.33 
 
2. Using Social Media for Service of Process 
 
After some preliminary considerations on the use of social media in services of 
process (part 2.1), we describe the current common law trend of effecting service of process 
through social networking sites (part 2.2). We then give a short overview of how service of 
process is effectuated in Belgium, as an example of a civil law country (part. 2.3). Finally, 
having taken note of the service of process framework in Belgium and the absence of social 
media as a form of acceptable notice, we reflect on the possible introduction of such service 
within that jurisdiction (part 2.4). 
 
2.1. Preliminary Considerations  
 
Imagine you open Facebook Messenger and you see the new message notification. It 
is a message informing you that you have been sued and that you are to appear in court as 
defendant in a family law case involving proof of paternity. Or: you are browsing through 
Instagram when you suddenly receive a DM (Direct Message). There is a lawsuit pending 
against you. You have been served in an insurance matter through the DM. Or: you often 
use LinkedIn to keep track of your contacts’ occupations and achievements. One day your 
LinkedIn inbox indicates that you have a new message. The LinkedIn message contains a 
summons and a claim form. A foreign company is taking you to court for trademark 
infringement. Futuristic scenario’s? Think again! These situations have actually taken place 
in the last decade in Australia34, Canada35 and the United States36 respectively.  
In a number of common law jurisdictions around the world courts have allowed 
plaintiffs to notify the defendant of the commencement of legal proceedings (i.e. service of 
process) through the use of social networking platforms. The list of social media is long but 
the ones most often used for service of process are Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn and 
Instagram. When mentioning this relatively recent line of private law cases to lawyers with 
civil law backgrounds, reactions ranging from mild amused surprise to utter shock and 
disgust can be observed. In civil law nations effecting service of process through social 
																																								 																				
33 J. De Bruyne & J. Tanghe, ‘Liability for Damage Caused by Autonomous Vehicles: a Belgian 
Perspective’ [2018] 8 J.E.T.L. 362-363 & 370.  
34 Federal Magistrates Court of Australia, Byrne & Howard, 21 April 2010, [2010] FMCAfam 509. 
35 A. Robinson, ‘Toronto lawyer serves claim with Instagram’, 2 February 2018, 
http://www.canadianlawyermag.com/legalfeeds/author/alex-robinson/toronto-lawyer-serves-claim-
with-instagram-15294/.  
36 United States District Court, Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, WhosHere, Inc. v. 
Gokhan Orun, 20 February 2014, 2014 WL 670817. 
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media is completely unknown. Whereas the use of e-mail for service purposes seems to 
have become increasingly more well established, the use of social media as an avenue for 
notification of the commencement of proceedings appears to be in a whole different ballpark. 
As such, scholars in civil law EU Member States have not yet addressed this relatively new 
development within the common law world. This is unfortunate as getting insight into the 
practice might prove valuable for enhancing our own service rules. This contribution, 
therefore, undertakes an analysis of the reported cases to subsequently contemplate on a 
general level whether social media service will ever form part of the service methods on the 
EU continent.  
 
2.2. Social Media Service: a Common Law phenomenon 
 
As mentioned, social media service has been observed in common law jurisdictions. 
After a brief discussion of the roots of the use of social media in service of process (part 
2.2.1.), we will examine the conditions laid down by the case law more thoroughly (part 
2.2.2.).   
 
2.2.1. How it all begun 
 
The actual cradle of social media service is to be situated in Australia (at least judging 
by the reported cases). In MKM v. Corbo & Poyser the defendants had taken out a home 
refinancing loan with MKM Capital but had failed to keep up with payments.37 MKM obtained 
a default judgment permitting seizure of the property. Before the judgment could be 
executed it had to be served on the defendants. However, defendants had moved away, had 
switched jobs and had changed their phone numbers. Repeated efforts at personal service 
as well as service by mail and publication did not lead to the desired result. MKM therefore 
made the ground-breaking move of seeking permission to effect service through the 
defendants’ Facebook accounts. The lawyers had located both defendants on the social 
networking site. To that end they used the personal information the couple had supplied 
themselves during the loan application process. They were able to link the defendants’ date 
of birth and their e-mail addresses to the Facebook profiles (which were not protected by 
stringent privacy settings). Master Harper therefore gave plaintiff MKM the green light to 
inform defendants of the entry and terms of the default judgment via a private Facebook 
message. In addition, the order had to be served via e-mail and by leaving a sealed copy at 
their last known address. 
Although the origin of social media service lies Down Under, the current centre of 
gravity for this rather contentious method of service has shifted to the United States. The 
first approval by an American court came in the case of Jessica Mpafe v. Clarence Mpafe.38 
A wife wished to divorce her husband but it was believed he had left the territory of the 
																																								 																				
37 Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory, MKM Capital Pty Ltd. v. Corbo & Poyser, 16 
December 2008, no. SC 608. 
38 Fourth District Family Court of Minnesota (Hennepin County), Jessica Mpafe v. Clarence Mpafe, 10 
May 2011, no. 27-FA-11-3453. 
 85 
United States.39 Judge Kevin S. Burke noted: “The traditional way to get service by 
publication is antiquated and is prohibitively expensive. Service is critical, and technology 
provides a cheaper and hopefully more effective way of finding Respondent.”40 The judge is 
further quoted as stating that: “Nobody, particularly poor people, is going to look at the legal 
newspaper to notice that their spouse wants to get divorced.”41 He ordered service to 
include, but not be limited to, contact via any Facebook, Myspace, or other social networking 
site, contact via e-mail and contact through information that would appear through an 
internet search engine such as Google.42 
 
2.2.2. Conditions 
 
State court litigation is governed by state law provisions whereas the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure (FRCP) determine the service regime for federal cases. For domestic 
service Rule 4(e)(1) FRCP refers to state provisions as it permits following state law for 
serving a summons in an action brought in courts of general jurisdiction in the state where 
the district court is located or where service is made. Under state law more unconventional 
methods of service are available in comparison to the federal rules. In some states catch-all 
provisions are in place. §308(5) of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules (N.Y. CPLR), 
for instance, states that the court may order service in any manner, if the other (traditional) 
methods of service provided by § 308 N.Y. CPLR are impracticable. Impracticability however 
“does not require proof of due diligence or of actual prior attempts to serve a party under the 
other provisions of the statute”.43 For service abroad, Rule 4(f)(3) FRCP gives the judge the 
possibility to order any method he deems appropriate, as long as the method is not 
prohibited by international agreement. The provision offers this option without any need for 
the plaintiff to first attempt service via the other methods listed in Rule 4(f) FRCP.44 
A scrutiny of the available cases reveals that the majority of courts have approved of 
social media service in combination with another form of service. In Mpafe v. Mpafe, for 
instance, service through social networking platforms was ordered together with inter alia e-
mail service.45 In Ferrarese v. Shaw plaintiff begun proceedings against his elusive ex-wife 
who had disappeared with their daughter. The federal court decided that service on the ex-
wife should be effected via e-mail, Facebook message and certified mail on defendant’s last 
																																								 																				
39 H. Van Horn, ‘Evolutionary Pull, Practical Difficulties, and Ethical Boundaries: Using Facebook to 
Serve Process on International Defendants’ [2013] 26 Global Business & Development Law Journal 
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San Diego L.Rev. 790. 
40 Fourth District Family Court of Minnesota (Hennepin County), Jessica Mpafe v. Clarence Mpafe, 10 
May 2011, no. 27-FA-11-3453. 
41 S. Ward, ‘Our Pleasure to Serve You: More Lawyers Look to Social Networking Sites to Notify 
Defendants’ [2011] 97 A.B.A.J. 14. 
42 Fourth District Family Court of Minnesota (Hennepin County), Jessica Mpafe v. Clarence Mpafe,10  
May 2011, no. 27-FA-11-3453. 
43 District Court for the Southern District of New York, Fortunato v. Chase Bank, 7 June 2012, 2012 
WL 2086950; District Court for the Southern District of New York, S.E.C. v. HGI, Inc., 8 November 
1999, 99 Civ. 3866, 1999 WL 1021087. 
44 United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, Rio Properties, Inc. v. Rio International Interlink, 20 
March 2002, 284 F.3d, 1015. 
45 Fourth District Family Court of Minnesota (Hennepin County), Jessica Mpafe v. Clarence Mpafe, 10 
May 2011, No. 27-FA-11-3453. 
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known address and on defendant’s sister.46 The Family Court decision in Noel Biscocho v. 
Anna Maria Antigua is another excellent example of the judicial hesitance to completely step 
away from traditional methods of service in favour of the newly discovered service channel 
offered by social media. A father who was seeking to modify an order of child support was 
allowed to serve the mother via Facebook. However, he also had to follow up with a mailing 
of the summons and the petition to the mother’s last known address, even though the court 
recognised that prior service at that address had been unsuccessful and her physical 
whereabouts uncertain.47 This cautious attitude is, however, not shared by all courts. Baidoo 
v. Blood-Dzraku appears to be the first reported case in which the court approved service by 
Facebook message as the sole method of service. The plaintiff was a married woman who 
wanted to divorce her husband. She had no physical address for him and he could not be 
served in person. The court did not require service via publication as a backup method to 
Facebook, deeming the former to be “essentially statutorily authorized non-service”.48  
The available case law tends to impose two requirements regarding the social media 
account to be served. First, the plaintiff has to provide the court with evidence that the 
account actually belongs to the defendant (authentication requirement). Second, the plaintiff 
needs to demonstrate that the defendant makes regular use of his account (evidence of use 
requirement). Both are logical conditions given the fact that the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution imposes that notice should be “reasonably 
calculated, under all circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the 
action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections”.49  
In Baidoo v. Blood-Dzraku the plaintiff was aided by the existence of conversations 
between her and her husband on Facebook. She submitted an affidavit to which she 
annexed copies of the exchanges between her and the defendant on Facebook and in which 
she identified the defendant as the subject of the photographs on the Facebook page in 
question. This satisfied the court that the account did belong to the defendant. As to 
evidence of regular use, the court was equally convinced by the exchanges between both 
parties as they indicated that the defendant regularly logged into his account.50 Conversely, 
in Fortunato v. Chase Bank the defendant wanted to bring the plaintiff’s daughter into the 
litigation. The request for service through the Facebook account of the daughter was denied 
for reasons of uncertainty regarding the authenticity of said account. The court argued that: 
“anyone can make a Facebook profile using real, fake, or incomplete information, and thus, 
there is no way for the Court to confirm whether the Nicole Fortunato the investigator found 
is in fact the third-party defendant to be served.”51  
 
2.3. Belgian Legal Framework 
 
In Belgium civil proceedings are initiated either by a writ of summons or by means of a 
petition. The most common method is the delivery of the writ of summons to the defendant 
																																								 																				
46 United States District Court, Eastern District of New York, Giovanni Ferrarese v. Vinda Shaw, 19 
January 2016, 164 F.Supp.3d 361. 
47 Family Court of the State of New York (County of Richmond), Noel B. v. Anna Maria A., 12 
September 2014, no. F00787-13/14B, 2014 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4708. 
48 Supreme Court of New York County, Baidoo v. Blood-Dzraku, 27 March 2015, 48 Misc 3d 316. 
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by the bailiff. The Belgian Judicial Code (BJC) lists a number of methods to effect this 
service of process (art. 33 et seq.). The bailiff will respect a certain order and will try to serve 
the defendant in person first. Service in person means that the bailiff hand delivers the writ 
of summons to the defendant.52 
If service in person is not possible, service can be effected at the domicile or, in 
absence of a domicile, the place of residence of the defendant, by leaving a copy of the writ 
with a relative, servant or agent, provided that the person is 16 years old or above.53 If the 
previous method of service is not possible, the bailiff can leave a copy of the writ in a sealed 
envelope at the domicile or the place of residence of the defendant, followed by a letter via 
registered mail the next business day.54 
Since 31 December 2016 the possibility for the bailiff exists to serve through e-mail. In 
civil matters the bailiff may choose the method of service (personal service or electronic 
service via e-mail) depending on the circumstances specific to the case.55 The bailiff can 
either use the “gerechtelijk elektronisch adres” (a unique e-mail address, issued by the 
government56) of the defendant or, for people who do not have such an address, the “adres 
van elektronische woonstkeuze” (a regular e-mail address, not issued by the government)57. 
In the latter case explicit consent needs to be obtained from the defendant each time the 
bailiff wishes to serve him through that e-mail address.58 In both cases the e-mail sent by the 
bailiff does not contain the actual document to be served. Rather, the content of the 
documents can only be consulted on a secure digital platform created for that purpose.  
If the defendant does not have a known domicile or place of residence at all (neither in 
Belgium nor abroad), the bailiff will serve the writ on the public prosecutor of the jurisdiction 
of the court which will deal with the claim.59 
 
2.4. Social Media Service in Belgium?  
 
It is not our intention to forecast whether the Belgian legislator will ever decide to 
incorporate social media service as a service method. We will, however, set out which 
choices can be made and will signal some of the issues that will have to be dealt with.  
First of all, one can wonder which advantages social media offer. One distinct 
advantage of social media service lies in the fact that it is able to achieve a high likelihood of 
actual notice. Users of social media platforms typically access their accounts on a regular 
basis.60 A recent press release by Facebook, for instance, showed that there were 2.32 
billion monthly active users as of 31 December 2018.61 Social media are oftentimes 
accessed on mobile devices. On these devices users run applications that push instant 
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notifications alerting the account holder of activity on his profile.62 Besides, if service is 
performed via a private Facebook message or via a post on the defendant’s Facebook wall, 
the likelihood of actual notice is even amplified. Under the default settings, the defendant will 
receive a notification through e-mail of the message or of the post and any subsequent 
comments.63 
Compared to the second-newest kid on the block, e-mail service, social media holds a 
few trump cards. In case of service via e-mail there is no possibility to determine whether the 
e-mail address belongs to the defendant unless the defendant states so himself.64 A social 
media account, on the other hand, can be scrutinised to verify the identity of the holder if the 
privacy settings allow it. Additionally, e-mail is more prone to spam attacks.65 In that regard, 
social media networks fare better.66 Spam messages are less common on social media 
platforms and malicious messages are less problematic because users can often view the 
sender’s profile without opening the message or they can adjust their settings to disallow 
messages from individuals who they have not added as “friends”.67 
A subsequent question would be whether there is a need for this type of service to be 
implemented in Belgium. It is unlikely that the Belgian legislator will introduce social media 
service as a self-standing independent method. For Belgium, where e-mail service is still in 
its infancy, this would be too radical. In our opinion, there could nevertheless be a place for 
this innovative method in the Belgian system.  
In part 3.3 it was explained that service on defendants who do not have a known 
domicile or place of residence is replaced by service on the public prosecutor of the 
jurisdiction of the competent court.68 In Belgium the National Chamber of Bailiffs does not 
keep statistics on the number of times service is in that regard effected on the public 
prosecutor. In the Netherlands, on the contrary, such figures are available. The Dutch 
service rules also require that a defendant without a known domicile or place of residence be 
served through the office of the public prosecutor at the court where the claim will be heard. 
Before that date these so-called “public writs” were published in daily newspapers. 
According to a study around 45.000 public writs are served each year.69 Additionally, it is 
stated that bailiffs receive little or no response to public writs published in newspapers.70  
There is no reason why these findings cannot be transposed to Belgium. It is 
extremely likely that the “artificial” service on the prosecutor does not inform the persons in 
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question, given the results in the Netherlands where service on the prosecutor is even 
combined with service by publication. It is here that social media service could play a role. 
Belgian lawmakers could make it obligatory for plaintiffs to undertake a reasonable attempt 
to serve the elusive defendant via his social media channels, if any. It can be expected that 
such a subsidiary place for social media service will prompt less resistance than embracing 
it as a full-blown mechanism. Furthermore, because social media service is deployed as a 
supplement to an established method, it will alleviate at least some of the sceptical concerns 
raised by its opponents.  
As to the concrete organisation of social media service, the Belgian legislator will face 
further issues. Certain safeguards relating to the authentication and regular use of the 
account will need to be construed. The American experience might serve as a source of 
inspiration. A further specific difficulty that can be identified relates to the bailiff who has to 
effect the service. Does the bailiff have to use an official account or can he use the account 
of the plaintiff or can he even send the notice via a fake account? Time will tell to what 
extent Belgium will “connect” with social media, if at all.  
 
Conclusion   
 
The article examined whether some of the existing legal principles in two different 
fields are compatible with technological evolutions. With regard to self-driving cars, some 
legal changes at the national level are inevitable. Legislation dealing with road safety is not 
yet adopted to the introduction of autonomous vehicles. We have also shown that the 
application of some of the concepts used in the Product Liability Directive might become 
problematic when SDCs will be commercialised. For instance, the moment of putting the 
product into circulation might be incompatible with autonomous systems. In any case, when 
policymakers would change the legal framework, they should take into account that a minor 
modification of one aspect (e.g. qualification of software) can have major consequences on 
the liability of the manufacturers of software or of the SDC. Therefore, we suggest a 
balanced and well-considered approach when it comes to adapting the existing legal 
framework to technological evolutions.71 
As to service of process via social media, the article explored the remarkable finding 
that some courts in common law countries have allowed the notice of the commencement of 
civil proceedings to be effected via one or more social media accounts belonging to the 
defendant. In contrast, in civil law EU jurisdictions this phenomenon does not exist. The 
article laid the conditions imposed by American courts for this type of service bare and 
subsequently gave an overview of the Belgian procedural framework. Even though it 
remains to be seen whether the Belgian legislator will ever be tempted by this novel method 
of service, it is submitted that social media service could be useful as a second layer of 
subsidiary notice when the defendant does not have a known address.  
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